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SECURITY INFORMATION

JUN 23 1952

SUGGESTED REVISION TO NIE-61, DRAFT DATED 23 JUNE.

C. Effect on Soviet Bloc Military Capabilities

26. The immediate effect of Communist control of the subcontinent on Soviet Bloc military capabilities would be (a) relief from the potential danger of Western air attack from Pakistani bases; (b) denial of the forces and facilities of the subcontinent to the West; (c) the diversion of Western military resources to the support of the Middle East and Southeast Asia; (d) the diversion of Western combat strength to defensive operations in the Indian Ocean in the event of war.

27. Apart from the foregoing consequences, the Soviet Bloc would gain the pool of potential military strength surrendered by the West. The communization of the country would involve a reorientation under Soviet direction of the armed forces, which if experience in other Satellites and China is any criterion, would go hand and glove with the political reorientation. The military forces would almost certainly be reconstructed to insure internal Communist control, to insure denial of the subcontinent to future inroads of the West; and to spread Communist control in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

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28.

- a. Such a long-range and large-scale buildup of subcontinent military forces and installations would require an investment in technical and material assistance, either through direct supply of military end-items or through development of the subcontinent's now limited war industry. This investment could probably be made without undue effect on requirements elsewhere in the Bloc although these are likely to remain pressing for many years to come.
- b. Difficulties of access and control would make a Soviet investment in subcontinent military power a risky one. Unlike Communist China, the subcontinent has no major land communications with the present Soviet Bloc and would therefore have to be supplied almost entirely by sea and air. In the event of war, the subcontinent military establishment's supply lines would thus be gravely vulnerable to Western naval interdiction.
- c. A large-scale buildup of the subcontinent military establishment, especially one which lessened the

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subcontinent's dependence on vulnerable supply lines, might weaken the control which the USSR itself could exercise over the subcontinent in event there arose a dissident Communist leadership in the subcontinent.

- d. Such a buildup would offer very considerable strategic gains to the Soviets by increasing the security of the Soviet territory and by the facilities it would provide^{it} to contest the control of the Indian Ocean.

On balance we believe the Soviets would attempt to create a strong military position in the Communist subcontinent.

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